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Abstract
The analysis of single-valued solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable
utilities has a long tradition. Opposed to most of this literature we will not deal with
solution concepts that provide payoﬀs to the players for the grand coalition only, but we
will analyze allocation scheme rules, which assign payoﬀs to all players in all coalitions. We
introduce four closely related allocation scheme rules for coalitional games. Each of these
rules results in a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) whenever the underlying
coalitional game allows for a PMAS. The driving force behind these rules are monotonici-
ties, which measure the payoﬀ diﬀerence for a player between two nested coalitions. From
a functional point of view these monotonicities can best be compared with the excesses in
the deﬁnition of the (pre-)nucleolus. Two diﬀerent domains and two diﬀerent collections
of monotonicities result in four allocation scheme rules. For each of the rules we deal with
nonemptiness, uniqueness, and continuity, followed by an analysis of conditions for (some
of) the rules to coincide. We then focus on characterizing the rules in terms of subbalanced
weights. Finally, we deal with computational issues by providing a sequence of linear pro-
grams.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of single-valued solution concepts for coalitional games with transferable utilities
has a long tradition. Following the seminal introduction of the Shapley value (cf. Shapley
(1953)), a lot of attention has been paid to this value as well as to other solution concepts.
Well-known rules include the (pre-)nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)), τ-value (cf. Tijs (1981))
and the egalitarian solution (cf. Dutta and Ray (1989)).
Following comments in Dutta and Ray (1989), Sprumont (1990) deals with not only specify-
ing payoﬀs for all players in the grand coalition, but also for any other coalition. His concern is
to guarantee that once a group of players has decided on a coalition no player in this coalition
is ever tempted to form a smaller coalition. This naturally results in the concept of population
monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS). Two key issues in Sprumont (1990) are the issue of
when a game allows for a PMAS and the issue how to construct such allocation schemes. The
ﬁrst issue is handled by providing suﬃcient conditions, e.g., convexity, and by characterizing
the games with a PMAS as the games that can be written as a positive linear combination
of monotonic simple games with at least one veto player. The second issue is partly tackled
by Sprumont (1990) by considering an extended Shapley value for the class of games with
increasing average marginal contributions.
The ﬁrst issue also comes to the fore in Norde and Reijnierse (2002). They introduce
vectors of subbalanced weights and prove that a game has a PMAS if and only if it satisﬁes all
inequalities corresponding to these vectors of subbalanced weights. This parallels the result of
Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) who identiﬁed the class of games with a nonempty core
as the class of games that satisfy all inequalities corresponding to vectors of balanced weights.
Furthermore, relevant for constructing a PMAS, Norde and Reijnierse (2002) prove that up to
4 persons every integer-valued game with a PMAS has an integer-valued PMAS. Additionally,
they present a 7-person integer-valued game with a PMAS that does not have an integer-valued
PMAS. Slikker et al. (2003) show that the class of games with a PMAS corresponds to the
class of games that result from information sharing situations.
As far as we know, the literature on rules that result in a payoﬀ scheme, i.e. a scheme that
does not only specify a payoﬀ vector for the grand coalition but also for each subcoalition, for
any coalitional game is scarce. Usually, these rules, which we will call allocation scheme rules,
are based on allocation rules for coalitional games, simply applied to the game itself and all its
subgames. Here, we depart from this approach and explicitly focus on allocation scheme rules
themselves. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in a rule that results in a PMAS whenever the game
under consideration has a PMAS. We will come up with four closely related allocation scheme
rules that satisfy the required property. These four rules coincide on the class of games with
a PMAS. We present a sequence of linear programs leading to one of those rules. This settles
the second issue raised by Sprumont (1990).
The basic idea for the allocation scheme rules is similar to the basic idea underlying the
(pre-)nucleolus. For any eﬃcient payoﬀ scheme we determine the change in payoﬀ for a player
if we enlarge the coalition he belongs to. These so-called monotonicities are then ordered
increasingly and we select the payoﬀ scheme that lexicographically maximizes this ordered3
vector of monotonicities. Four variants result by considering two possible domains for the
payoﬀ schemes, based on the imputation set and the preimputation set, and two collections of
monotonicities.
We prove nonemptiness, uniqueness, and continuity of our allocation scheme rules. Further-
more, we show for each of these four rules that a resulting payoﬀ scheme can be characterized in
terms of the carriers of minimal monotonicities allowing for subbalanced weights. These results
are in line with results for the (pre-)nucleolus of Schmeidler (1969) and Kohlberg (1971). For
an extensive survey of results on the (pre-)nucleolus we refer to Maschler (1992).
The setup of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries, followed by the
deﬁnition of four allocation scheme rules in Section 3. Section 4 deals with nonemptiness,
uniqueness, continuity, and comparison between the rules. Moreover, this section contains
characterizations in terms of subbalanced weights. The computation of the rules is addressed
in Section 5. We conclude in section 6
2 Preliminaries
A coalitional game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N,v) where N = {1,...,n}
denotes the set of players and v is a real-valued function on the family 2N of all subsets of
N with v(∅) = 0. The function v is called the characteristic function of the coalitional game
(N,v).
A payoﬀ vector x = (xi)i∈N ∈ I RN speciﬁes for each player i ∈ N the beneﬁt (e.g., (extra)
proﬁt) xi that this player can expect if he cooperates with the other players.
A payoﬀ vector is called eﬃcient if the payoﬀs to the various players add up to exactly
v(N). The set consisting of all eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors is the preimputation set PI(N,v) =
{x ∈ I RN |
P
i∈N xi = v(N)}. Note that not all these payoﬀ vectors will be acceptable to the
players, as each player will require that he gets at least as much as what he can obtain when
staying alone. A payoﬀ vector x ∈ I RN with the property that xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N is
called individually rational. The set of all individually rational and eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors is
the imputation set I(N,v) = {x ∈ I RN |
P
i∈N xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for each i ∈ N}.
The core Core(N,v) of a game (N,v) consists of the payoﬀ vectors x ∈ I RN that satisfy the
condition
P
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N and
P
i∈N xi = v(N). For a coalition S ⊆ N, v|S
denotes the restriction of the characteristic function v to the player set S, i.e., v|S(T) = v(T)
for each coalition T ⊆ S. The pair (S,v|S) is a coalitional game with player set S, called a
subgame of (N,v). A game is called balanced if it has a nonempty core and totally balanced
if all its subgames are balanced. We will use the notions ‘balancedness’ and ‘nonemptiness of
the core’ interchangeably. The terminology ‘balanced’ is due to Bondareva (1963) and Shapley
(1967). They independently identiﬁed the class of games that have nonempty cores as the class
of balanced games. To describe this last class, we deﬁne for all S ⊆ N the vector eS ∈ I RN by
eS
i = 1 for all i ∈ S and eS
i = 0 for all i ∈ N\S. A map κ : 2N\{∅} → [0,1] is called a balanced
map if
P
S∈2N\{∅} κ(S)eS = eN. Now, a game (N,v) is called balanced if for every balanced
map κ : 2N\{∅} → [0,1] it holds that
P
S∈2N\{∅} κ(S)v(S) ≤ v(N). We will refer to this last4
condition as a balancedness condition.
Sprumont (1990) considered payoﬀ schemes rather than payoﬀ vectors. A payoﬀ scheme
prescribes a payoﬀ for all players, not only for the grand coalition, but for any coalition they
belong to. So, a payoﬀ scheme for game (N,v) can be represented by y = (yS,i)S⊆N,i∈S ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS. The focus of Sprumont (1990) was on population monotonic allocation schemes
(PMAS): a vector (yS,i)S⊆N,i∈S is a population monotonic allocation scheme for the coalitional
game (N,v) if it satisﬁes the following conditions:
(a)
P
i∈S yS,i = v(S) for all S ⊆ N;
(b) yS,i ≤ yT,i for all S,T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T and all i ∈ S.
We remark that condition (b) is equivalent to the condition where one considers pairs S,T
with |T| = |S| + 1 only. Throughout this paper we will denote the set {(i,S,T) | i ∈ S ⊂ T ⊆
N,|T| = |S| + 1} by S.
Norde and Reijnierse (2002) gave a description of the class of games with a PMAS similar to
the description of the class of games with a nonempty core as balanced games. They introduced
the concept of vector of subbalanced weights, VSW for short: a vector (γS)S∈2N\{∅}
1 is a VSW







for all S ∈ 2N\{∅} and i ∈ S. The collection {(i,S,T) ∈ S | µ(i,S,T) > 0} will be called a
carrier of the VSW (γS)S∈2N\{∅}
2.
The main result of Norde and Reijnierse (2002) states that a game (N,v) has a PMAS if




A (single-valued) allocation rule is a function γ that assigns a payoﬀ vector γ(N,v) ∈ I RN
to every coalitional game (or possibly to every game in some speciﬁc subclass of games).
Similarly, a (single-valued) allocation scheme rule is a function η that assigns a payoﬀ scheme
η(N,v) ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS to every coalitional game (or possibly to every game in some speciﬁc
subclass of games). The two most-cited allocation rules are the (pre-)nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler
(1969)) and the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)). The (pre-)nucleolus always selects a core-
element, whenever the core is nonempty. In order to deﬁne the nucleolus we ﬁrst need the
concept of ‘ordering function’. If K is a ﬁnite set then the ordering function on I RK is the
function ηK : I RK → I R|K|, deﬁned by the following subsequent steps: ηK
1 (x) = min{xj|j ∈ K}.
Choosing j1 ∈ K such that ηK
1 (x) = xj1 we have ηK
2 (x) = min{xj|j ∈ K\{j1}}, etcetera.3
1The original deﬁnition of Norde and Reijnierse (2002) used disjoint subsets Λ and ∆ of 2
N\{∅} in order to
describe a VSW, where Λ = {S ∈ 2
N\{∅} | γS < 0} and ∆ = {S ∈ 2
N\{∅} | γS > 0}.
2For a VSW (γS)S∈2N\{∅} the corresponding set of (positive) weights µ(i,S,T) need not be uniquely determined.
3In a more formal way the function η
K is deﬁned by η
K
i (x) = min{max{xj|j ∈ L}|L ⊆ K,|L| = i} for every
i ∈ {1,...,|K|}.5
Now the (pre-)nucleolus is deﬁned as follows. Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. For any payoﬀ





Let θ(x) ∈ I R2n
have the satisfactions of payoﬀ vector x ordered increasingly, i.e. θ(x) =
η2N
((s(S,x))S⊆N). Then the nucleolus ν(N,v) is deﬁned, in case the imputation set is not
empty, as the set of vectors in the imputation set whose θ’s are lexicographically maximal.
The prenucleolus is deﬁned similarly, but considering the preimputation set, rather than the
imputation set. Both the nucleolus and the prenucleolus always consist of a single payoﬀ
vector, which is referred to as the nucleolus or prenucleolus as well. In case the core of a game
is nonempty, the nucleolus and the prenucleolus coincide.
3 The (pre-)monoclus: deﬁnitions
Both the nucleolus as well as the prenucleolus of a coalitional game result in an element of the
core of this game, whenever this core is nonempty. The basic idea underlying this work is to
look for a rule that leads to payoﬀ schemes that are population monotonic, whenever a PMAS
exists.
The vehicle, used by the (pre-)nucleolus, that measures whether a payoﬀ vector is in the
core is the set of satisfactions. Whenever all satisfactions are nonnegative for some eﬃcient
payoﬀ vector, one obviously deals with a core element. Having the vector of satisfactions
ordered increasingly and subsequently lexicographically maximized results in the unique (pre-)
nucleolus.
Requiring a payoﬀ scheme to be a PMAS can be considered in a similar way. Rather
than making sure that satisfactions are nonnegative, one can look at so-called monotonicities,
describing the change in payoﬀ a player experiences if his coalition is supplemented with some
other players. Formally, for a payoﬀ scheme x = (xS,i)S⊆N,i∈S ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS and triple (i,S,T),
with i ∈ S ⊂ T ⊆ N, the monotonicity of x with respect to (i,S,T) is deﬁned as
mon(x,(i,S,T)) = xT,i − xS,i.
Obviously, for an eﬃcient payoﬀ scheme, being population monotonic corresponds to all mono-
tonicities being nonnegative.
The main line of research on the nucleolus focuses on two variants. First the nucleolus
itself, and second the prenucleolus. The diﬀerence between the two is the domain of payoﬀ
vectors that is taken into account. This domain is the preimputation set for the prenucleolus
and the imputation set for the nucleolus. A similar distinction will be made in this paper, but
for payoﬀ schemes rather than payoﬀ vectors. We distinguish between the product set of the
preimputation sets and the product set of the imputation sets.




An additional distinction will be made regarding the monotonicity conditions that should
be taken into account. A PMAS requires a nondecreasing payoﬀ for all i ∈ N and all S,T ⊆ N
with i ∈ S ⊆ T. As remarked before, one could restrict to such S,T with |T| = |S|+1 as well.
This has no impact on the deﬁnition of PMAS, but it slightly changes the rules we develop if
we restrict attention to a restricted set of monotonicities. Though deﬁning four variants we
will later on show that they oftentimes coincide, for example on the class of games that have
a PMAS.
Let
T = {(i,S,T) | i ∈ S ⊂ T ⊆ N}.
Note that
T ⊃ S(= {(i,S,T) | i ∈ S ⊂ T ⊆ N;|T| = |S| + 1}).
An arbitrary payoﬀ scheme thus results in two sets of monotonicities, those associated with T
and those associated with S. We ﬁrst focus on the second set. For all x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S)
θA(x) ∈ I R|S| has all monotonicities of x, corresponding to elements in S, as its coordinates
in a (weakly) increasing order, i.e. θA(x) = ηS((mon(x,(i,S,T)))(i,S,T)∈S).
So, the ﬁrst coordinate of θA(x) is the lowest monotonicity that is encountered in payoﬀ scheme
x. Consequently, x is a PMAS if and only if this ﬁrst coordinate of θA(x) is nonnegative.
We can now deﬁne the following two monocli.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Premonoclus A:
M∗,A(N,v) = {x ∈
Y
S⊆N




Deﬁnition 3.2 Monoclus A: If
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S) 6= ∅ then
MA(N,v) = {x ∈
Y
S⊆N




Note that the diﬀerence between the two payoﬀ scheme rules is the domain that is considered:
the product of the preimputation sets for premonoclus A and the product of the imputation
sets for monoclus A. Hence, monoclus A is well-deﬁned only if all subgames have a nonempty
imputation set.
Similarly, taking all monotonicities in T into account, for all x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S)
θB(x) ∈ I R|T | has all monotonicities of x, corresponding to elements in T , as its coordi-
nates in a (weakly) increasing order, i.e. θB(x) = ηT ((mon(x,(i,S,T)))(i,S,T)∈S).
The ﬁrst coordinate is again the lowest monotonicity that is encountered in payoﬀ scheme x.
Similar to our remarks above, x is a PMAS if and only if this ﬁrst coordinate of θB(x) is
nonnegative.
Using this, we can deﬁne two additional monocli.7
Deﬁnition 3.3 Premonoclus B:
M∗,B(N,v) = {x ∈
Y
S⊆N




Deﬁnition 3.4 Monoclus B: If
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S) 6= ∅ then
MB(N,v) = {x ∈
Y
S⊆N




The distinction between the two is similar to the diﬀerence between premonoclus A and
monoclus A. As for monoclus A, we remark that monoclus B is well-deﬁned only if all subgames
have a nonempty imputation set.
Maschler et al. (1992) generalize the nucleolus to arbitrary pairs consisting of a topological
space and a ﬁnite set of real continuous functions with this topological space as their domain.
The four monocli described are all special cases of this general monoclus. The general setting
allows them to characterize this general nucleolus using properties that make explicit use of
the richness of their general approach. More speciﬁc, their characterization of general monocli
does not correspond to a characterization of the nucleolus in the classical setting. Neither does
it imply a characterization of the monocli in this classical setting.
It is well-known that the prenucleolus coincides with the nucleolus in case the prenucleo-
lus is an element of the imputation set. The following theorem provides a similar result for
(pre)monocli. The proof is obvious and therefore omitted.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. If M∗,A(N,v) (M∗,B(N,v)) ⊆
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S)
then M∗,A(N,v) = MA(N,v) (M∗,B(N,v) = MB(N,v)).
4 Nonemptiness, uniqueness, continuity and comparison
In this section we focus on nonemptiness, uniqueness, and continuity of the monocli deﬁned in
the previous section. Our main focus of attention will be on premonoclus A. We will afterwards
argue that similar results hold for the other monocli as well. We will end this section with a
comparison between the diﬀerent monocli.5
4.1 Premonoclus A
In this subsection, we ﬁrst show that premonoclus A is nonempty. Subsequently, we prove
that it always contains exactly one element and proceed then by presenting a characterizing
property. We conclude with a result that states that premonoclus A is continuous.
The following theorem states that every game has a nonempty premonoclus A.
5We remark that Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 can be proven using results of Maschler et al. (1992). We have chosen
for direct proofs for reasons of self-containedness.8
Theorem 4.1 Every coalitional game (N,v) has a nonempty M∗,A(N,v). Moreover,
M∗,A(N,v) is a compact subset of
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S).
Proof: Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. First we prove the following claim.




1. x 7→ mon(x,(i,S,T)) is a continuous function on
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S) for any (i,S,T) ∈ S;
2. θA
k (x) = min
n
max{mon(x,(i,S,T)) | (i,S,T) ∈ U} | U ⊆ S;|U| = k
o
.
Since the maximum or minimum of a ﬁnite number of continuous functions is continuous, we
derive that θA
k is continuous. This proves the claim.
Consider x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S) deﬁned by xS,i =
v(S)
|S| for all S ⊆ N and all i ∈ S. Let
m = min{mon(x,(i,S,T))|(i,S,T) ∈ S}. Let
M = {x ∈
Y
S⊆N
PI(S,v|S) | xS,i ≥ v({i}) + (|S| − 1)m for all S ⊆ N and i ∈ S}.
Note that M is nonempty (x ∈ M) and compact. Moreover, for any x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S)\M
it holds that θA
1 (x) < m and hence, θA(x) <L θA(x). Hence, M∗,A(N,v) ⊆ M.
Deﬁne
Y1 ={x ∈ M | θA
1 (x) ≥ θA
1 (y) for every y ∈ M};
Yk =

x ∈ Yk−1 | θA
k (x) ≥ θA
k (y) for every y ∈ Yk−1} for all k ∈ {2,...,|S|
	
.
Claim For any k ∈ {1,...,|S|} it holds that Yk is compact and nonempty.
We already argued that M is nonempty and compact. This and the continuity of θA
1 im-
plies that Y1 is compact and nonempty. Using continuity of θA
2 ,...,θA
|S| inductively implies
that all Y2,...,Y|S| are compact and nonempty. This concludes the proof of the claim.
We conclude that M∗,A(N,v) = Y|S| is nonempty and compact. 2
In order to show that premonoclus A always contains one element we ﬁrst need a lemma
about ordering functions.
Lemma 4.1 Let K be a ﬁnite set and let ηK be the ordering function on I RK. Then ηK(a +
b) ≥L ηK(a) + ηK(b) for every a,b ∈ I RK. Moreover, if ηK(a + b) = ηK(a) + ηK(b), then there
exist j1,...,j|K| ∈ K such that K = {j1,...,j|K|}, aj1 ≤ aj2 ≤ ··· ≤ aj|K| and bj1 ≤ bj2 ≤
··· ≤ bj|K|.
Proof: Let a,b ∈ I RK. Choose j1 ∈ K such that ηK
1 (a + b) = min{aj + bj|j ∈ K} = aj1 + bj1.
Then clearly ηK
1 (a + b) = aj1 + bj1 ≥ min{aj|j ∈ K} + min{bj|j ∈ K} = ηK
1 (a) + ηK
1 (b). If9
ηK
1 (a + b) > ηK
1 (a) + ηK
1 (b) then ηK(a + b) >L ηK(a) + ηK(b) and we are done. Otherwise,
we conclude that aj1 = min{aj|j ∈ K}, bj1 = min{bj|j ∈ K} and we choose j2 ∈ K such that
ηK
2 (a + b) = min{aj + bj|j ∈ K\{j1}} = aj2 + bj2. Again note that ηK
2 (a + b) = aj2 + bj2 ≥
min{aj|j ∈ K\{j1}} + min{bj|j ∈ K\{j1}} = ηK
2 (a) + ηK
2 (b). If ηK
2 (a + b) > ηK
2 (a) + ηK
2 (b)
then ηK(a + b) >L ηK(a) + ηK(b) and we are done. Otherwise, we conclude that aj2 =
min{aj|j ∈ K\{j1}}, bj2 = min{bj|j ∈ K\{j1}}. Proceeding in this way we ﬁnd that either
ηK(a + b) >L ηK(a) + ηK(b) or ηK(a + b) = ηK(a) + ηK(b) and there exists a sequence of
indices j1,...,j|K| ∈ K with the required properties. 2
Theorem 4.2 For every coalitional game (N,v) it holds that |M∗,A(N,v)| = 1.
Proof: Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. By Theorem 4.1 we know that M∗,A(N,v)
is nonempty and compact. Let x,y ∈ M∗,A(N,v) and assume that x 6= y. Let a =
(mon(x,(i,S,T)))(i,S,T)∈S and b = (mon(y,(i,S,T)))(i,S,T)∈S. Note that ηS(a) = θA(x) =
θA(y) = ηS(b). Let z = 1
2(x + y) ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S). Note that (mon(z,(i,S,T)))(i,S,T)∈S =
1




(a + b)) = ηS(a + b) ≥L ηS(a) + ηS(b) = 2θA(x),
so θA(z) ≥L θA(x). Since x ∈ M∗,A(N,v) we must have θA(z) = θA(x) and hence ηS(a + b) =
ηS(a) + ηS(b). According to Lemma 4.1 and the fact that ηS(a) = θA(x) = θA(y) = ηS(b) we
derive that a = b, i.e. for every (i,S,T) ∈ S we have
xT,i − xS,i = mon(x,(i,S,T))) = mon(y,(i,S,T))) = yT,i − yS,i.
Since for all i ∈ N
x{i},i = v({i}) = y{i},i
we conclude that x = y, which contradicts our assumption.
This completes the proof. 2
Let (N,v) be a coalitional game and let x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S) be an associated payoﬀ
scheme. Deﬁne
bA
1 (N,v,x) = argmin
S
mon(x,·)
and, inductively, for any k ≥ 1 while S\(∪k
r=1bA







Note that this results in an ordered partition of S. The index of the last element of this
partition will usually be denoted by px.10
Deﬁnition 4.1 An ordered partition (b1,...,bp) of S has Property 1A6 if for all k ∈
{1,...,p} and any scheme q ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS
(1) mon(q,(i,S,T)) ≥ 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk;
(2)
P
i∈T qT,i = 0 for all T ⊆ N
imply
(3) mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk.
The following theorem shows that a payoﬀ scheme is premonoclus A if and only the associ-
ated ordered partition satisﬁes property 1A.
Theorem 4.3 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game and let x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S) be a payoﬀ
scheme. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) x = M∗,A(N,v);7
(ii) (bA
1 (N,v,x),...,bA
px(N,v,x)) has property 1A.
Proof: Denote for all k ∈ {1,...,px} the number of elements of bA
k (N,v,x) by mk.
(i)⇒(ii) Suppose (i) is satisﬁed and (ii) is not satisﬁed. Let k be minimal such that there
exists a payoﬀ scheme q that satisﬁes (1) and (2) of property 1A, but not (3). Consider x+tq
with t > 0. Note that x+tq ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S). If t is small enough then the ﬁrst m1 elements
of θA(x + tq) are the monotonicities associated with the elements of bA
1 (N,v,x), followed by
the monotonicities associated with the elements of bA
2 (N,v,x), etc.
Using (1) of property 1A we have that for all (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k
r=1br(N,v,x) it holds that
mon(x + tq,(i,S,T)) = mon(x,(i,S,T)) + tmon(q,(i,S,T)) ≥ mon(x,(i,S,T)).
Since (3) of property 1A does not hold there exists (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k
r=1br(N,v,x) with
mon(q,(i,S,T)) > 0. Hence θA(x + tq) >L θA(x), which contradicts (i).
(ii)⇒(i) Suppose (ii) is satisﬁed. Suppose there exists a payoﬀ scheme y ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S)
with θA(y) ≥L θA(x). Hence, mon(y,(i,S,T)) ≥ mon(x,(i,S,T)) for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,x).
Consequently, mon(y − x,(i,S,T)) ≥ 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,x). Moreover, for every
T ⊆ N we have
P




i∈T xT,i = v(T) − v(T) = 0. So, scheme
q = y − x satisﬁes (1) and (2) of property 1A for k = 1. Using this property 1A, we derive
that mon(y − x,(i,S,T)) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,x). Applying a similar procedure
inductively on bA
2 (N,v,x),...,bA




k (N,v,x) = S. Using x{i},i = v({i}) = y{i},i for all i ∈ N, we conclude that
y = x. 2
The following result is a consequence of Theorem 4.3.
6Following the terminology in Kohlberg (1971).




Theorem 4.4 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game and let x ∈
Q
S⊆N PI(S,v|S) be a pay-
oﬀ scheme. If ∪k
r=1br(x,N,v) is the carrier of a VSW for every k ∈ {1,...,px}, then
x = M∗,A(N,v).
Proof: It is suﬃcient to show that (bA
1 (N,v,x),...,bA
px(N,v,x)) has property 1A. Let k ∈
{1,...,px} and q ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS be such that (1) and (2) of property 1A hold. Let (γS)S∈2N\{∅}
be a VSW with carrier ∪k





































































As µ(i,S,T) > 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k
r=1br(x,N,v) we conclude that mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0 for
every (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k
r=1br(x,N,v). 2
The following example illustrates the use of Theorem 4.3.




   
   
0 if |S| ≤ 1;
1 if S ∈ {{1,2},{1,2,3}};
2 if S = {1,3};
6 if S = {2,3}.





2 (N,v,x) = {(2,{1,2},N),(3,{1,3},N)}, bA
3 (N,v,x) =
{(2,{2},{1,2})}, bA
4 (N,v,x) = {(2,{2},{2,3})}, bA
5 (N,v,x) = {(3,{3},{1,3})} and12
1 2 3
{1} 0 * *
{2} * 0 *


















Table 1: M∗,A(N,v) in Example 4.1.
bA
6 (N,v,x) = {(3,{3},{2,3})}. In order to check that (bA
1 (N,v,x),...,bA
6 (N,v,x)) satis-
ﬁes property 1A we have to show that (1) and (2) imply (3) for every k ∈ {1,...,6}
and q ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS. We will do this for k = 1. Suppose q ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS is such that
mon(q,(i,S,T)) ≥ 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,x) and
P











= (qN,1 − q{1,2},1) + (q{1,2},1 − q{1},1) + (qN,2 − q{2,3},2) + (qN,3 − q{2,3},3)
= (qN,1 − q{1,3},1) + (q{1,3},1 − q{1},1) + (qN,2 − q{2,3},2) + (qN,3 − q{2,3},3).
Hence mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,x).
An alternative way to show that x = M∗,A(N,v) is by using Theorem 4.4 and showing that
∪k
r=1br(x,N,v) is the carrier of a VSW for every k ∈ {1,...,px}. Again we will only show
this for k = 1: note that bA
1 (N,v,x) is a carrier of VSW (γS)S∈2N\{∅}, where γN = 1,
γ{1} = γ{2,3} = −1 and γS = 0 otherwise. The corresponding weights can be chosen as
µ(1,{1},{1,2}) = µ(1,{1},{1,3}) = µ(1,{1,2},N) = µ(1,{1,3},N) = 1
2, µ(2,{2,3},N) = µ(3,{2,3},N) = 1 and
µ(i,S,T) = 0 otherwise. The associated VSW inequality is v(N) − v({1}) − v({2,3}) ≥ 0. 3
Theorem 4.5 M∗,A : TUN → I RN is a continuous function.
Proof: Consider a sequence of games (N,vl)∞
l=1 such that vl → v if l → ∞ for some game
(N,v), i.e. liml→∞ vl(S) = v(S) for every S ⊆ N. Let xl = M∗,A(N,vl) for all l ∈ I N. We will
show that xl → M∗,A(N,v) if l → ∞.
Let L > 0 be such that |vl(S)| ≤ L for every l ∈ I N and S ⊆ N. Deﬁne the compact set
M ⊆
Q
S⊆N I RS by M = {x ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS| − (2n − 1)L ≤ xS,i ≤ (2n2 − 3n + 2)L for every S ⊆
N and i ∈ S}. We will show that xl ∈ M for every l ∈ I N.






|S| for every S ⊆ N and i ∈ S. For






|S| ≥ − L
|T| − L
|S| ≥ −2L.
Since θA(xl) ≥L θA(yl) we have mon(xl,(i,S,T)) ≥ −2L for every (i,S,T) ∈ S. So, for every




{i},i) ≥ vl({i})+(|S|−1)·(−2L) ≥ −L+(n−





S,j ≤ L+(|S|−1)(2n−1))L ≤ L+(n−1)(2n−1))L = (2n2−3n+2)L.
This ﬁnishes the proof that xl ∈ M.
Hence, (xl)∞
l=1 has a convergent subsequence. Consider an arbitrary convergent subse-
quence (xlk)∞
k=1 of (xl)∞
l=1, and denote its limit point by y. Since the number of par-
titions of S is ﬁnite there is at least one ordered partition that appears inﬁnitely many




k=1. Select such an ordered par-
tition and denote the corresponding subsequence by (xmk)∞
k=1. Note that this sequence con-
verges to y and that by Theorem 4.3 the associated ordered partition satisﬁes property 1A.
Since all weak inequalities are preserved when taking the limit it follows immediately that
the ordered partition (bA
1 (N,v,y),...,bA
py(N,v,y)) is a coarsening of the ordered partition
(bA
1 (N,vmk,xmk),...,bA
pxmk(N,vmk,xmk)), which does not depend on k. Clearly, a coarsen-
ing of an ordered partition, satisfying property 1A, satisﬁes property 1A as well. Theorem 4.3
implies that y = M∗,A(N,v). Using that the sequence (xlk)∞
k=1 was chosen arbitrarily and the
partition as well implies that M∗,A(N,v) = y = liml→∞ xl = liml→∞ M∗,A(N,vl). 2
4.2 Other monocli
This section deals with results for the other three monocli that are similar to the results for
premonoclus A in the previous subsection.
Under the extra assumption that
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S) 6= ∅ Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 can be modiﬁed
in a straightforward way to monoclus A. In order to modify Theorem 4.3 we need to adjust
Deﬁnition 4.1.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let b0 ⊆ {(S,i)|i ∈ S ⊆ N} and let (b1,...,bp) be an ordered partition




(1) qS,i ≥ 0 for all (S,i) ∈ b0;
(2) mon(q,(i,S,T)) ≥ 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk;
(3)
P
i∈T qT,i = 0 for all T ⊆ N
imply
(4) mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ b1 ∪ ... ∪ bk.
For a coalitional game (N,v) and an x ∈
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S) we deﬁne
bA
0 (N,v,x) = {(S,i)|i ∈ S ⊆ N,xS,i = v({i})}.
The following theorem generalizes Theorem 4.3 to monoclus A. The proof is similar and
therefore omitted.14
Theorem 4.6 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game and let x ∈
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S) be a payoﬀ scheme.
The following two statements are equivalent:




px(N,v,x)) has property 2A.
Continuity of MA can be shown in a similar fashion as in Theorem 4.5.
Analogous results can be established for M∗,B and MB by considering set T instead of set
S. Deﬁnitions 4.1 and 4.2 are generalized to Property 1B and 2B respectively and deal with
ordered partitions of T . The proofs of all relevant theorems can be adjusted in an obvious way.
The following example illustrates how to use Theorem 4.6.
Example 4.2 Consider again the game (N,v) in Example 4.1. The values of y = MA(N,v)
are given in Table 2. Note that bA
0 (N,v,y) = {({1},1),({2},2),({3},3),(N,1),(N,2)},
1 2 3
{1} 0 * *
{2} * 0 *












N 0 0 1
Table 2: MA(N,v) in Example 4.2.
bA
1 (N,v,y) = {(2,{2,3},N),(3,{2,3},N)}, bA
2 (N,v,y) = {(1,{1,2},N),(1,{1,3},N)},
(2,{1,2},N),(3,{1,3},N)}, bA
3 (N,v,y) = {(1,{1},{1,2}),(1,{1},{1,3}),(2,{2},{1,2})},
bA
4 (N,v,y) = {(3,{3},{1,3})}, bA
5 (N,v,y) = {(2,{2},{2,3})} and bA
6 (N,v,y) =
{(3,{3},{2,3})}. In order to check that (bA
0 (N,v,y),...,bA
6 (N,v,y)) satisﬁes property 2A
we have to show that (1), (2) and (3) imply (4) for every k ∈ {1,...,6} and q ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS.
Again, we will only do this for k = 1. Suppose q ∈
Q
S⊆N I RS is such that qS,i ≥ 0 for every
(S,i) ∈ bA
0 (N,v,y), mon(q,(i,S,T)) ≥ 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,y) and
P
i∈T qT,i = 0 for all








= qN,1 + (qN,2 − q{2,3},2) + (qN,3 − q{2,3},3)
≥ (qN,2 − q{2,3},2) + (qN,3 − q{2,3},3).
Hence mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ bA
1 (N,v,y).
In a similar fashion we ﬁnd that MB(N,v) = MA(N,v) and that M∗,B is given by the
values in Table 3. 315
1 2 3
{1} 0 * *
{2} * 0 *


















Table 3: M∗,B(N,v) in Example 4.2.
The observation that MA(N,v) = MB(N,v) in the example above is not a coincidence.
One can show that these two monocli coincide for any 3-person game. The following example
illustrates that for 4-player games all monocli can be distinct.




      
      
240 if S = {1,2,3,4};
480 if S ∈ {{1,2,3},{1,2,4}};
960 if S ∈ {{1,2},{1,3,4}};
1200 if S = {2,3,4};
0 for other S.
The four monocli are given in Table 4. 3
M∗,A(N,v) MA(N,v) M∗,B(N,v) MB(N,v)
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
{1} 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * *
{2} * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 * *
{3} * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 *
{4} * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0 * * * 0
{1,2} 360 600 * * 480 480 * * 360 600 * * 360 600 * *
{1,3} 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 75 * -75 * 0 * 0 *
{1,4} 0 * * 0 0 * * 0 75 * * -75 0 * * 0
{2,3} * 0 0 * * 0 0 * * 75 -75 * * 0 0 *
{2,4} * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 75 * -75 * 0 * 0
{3,4} * * 0 0 * * 0 0 * * 0 0 * * 0 0
{1,2,3} 96 336 48 * 240 240 0 * 195 435 -150 * 120 360 0 *
{1,2,4} 96 336 * 48 240 240 * 0 195 435 * -150 120 360 * 0
{1,3,4} 96 * 432 432 240 * 360 360 360 * 300 300 320 * 320 320
{2,3,4} * 336 432 432 * 320 440 440 * 600 300 300 * 560 320 320
{1,2,3,4} -168 72 168 168 0 0 120 120 30 270 -30 -30 0 240 0 0
Table 4: M∗,A(N,v),MA(N,v),M∗,B(N,v) and MB(N,v) in Example 4.3.
4.3 Comparison of monocli
If a game admits a PMAS all monocli coincide.16
Theorem 4.7 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game with a PMAS. Then M∗,A(N,v) =
MA(N,v) = MB(N,v) = M∗,B(N,v).
Proof: Let x = (xS,i)S⊆N,i∈S be a PMAS of (N,v). Since xS,i ≥ x{i},i = v({i}) for every S ⊆ N
and i ∈ S we have x ∈
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S). Since both θA(x) and θB(x) are nonnegative we infer
that M∗,A(N,v) and M∗,B(N,v) are PMAS too and hence both elements of
Q
S⊆N I(S,v|S).
Using Theorem 3.1 we have M∗,A(N,v) = MA(N,v) and M∗,B(N,v) = MB(N,v). We still
have to show that M∗,A(N,v) = M∗,B(N,v).
Let y = M∗,B(N,v). Then (bB
1 (N,v,y),...,bB
pB
y (N,v,y)) satisﬁes property 1B, ac-




y (N,v,y)) satisﬁes property 1A, since then, according to Theorem 4.3,
y = M∗,A(N,v).
Let k ∈ {1,...,pA
y } and q ∈
Q





i∈T qT,i = 0 for every T ⊆ N. Let u ∈ I R be such that
u = mon(y,(i,S,T)) for every (i,S,T) ∈ bA
k (N,v,y). Let k∗ ∈ {1,...,pB
y } be such that
mon(y,(i,S,T)) ≤ u for every (i,S,T) ∈ bB
l (N,v,y) with l ≤ k∗ and mon(y,(i,S,T)) > u
for every (i,S,T) ∈ bB






Let (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k∗
l=1bB
l (N,v,y). Then yT,i − yS,i ≤ u. Since y is a PMAS we have 0 ≤
yW,i−yV,i ≤ u for all V,W ⊆ N with S ⊆ V ⊆ W ⊆ T and |W| = |V |+1. So, for all such V and
W we get (i,V,W) ∈ ∪k
l=1bA
l (N,v,y) and hence qW,i − qV,i = mon(q,(i,V,W)) ≥ 0. Therefore
mon(q,(i,S,T)) = qT,i − qS,i ≥ 0. Since (bB
1 (N,v,y),...,bB
pB
y (N,v,y)) satisﬁes property 1B we
derive that mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k∗
l=1bB
l (N,v,y). Hence mon(q,(i,S,T)) = 0
for all (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k
l=1bA
l (N,v,y), so (bA
1 (N,v,y),...,bA
pA
y (N,v,y)) satisﬁes property 1A. 2
The following example shows that the converse of Theorem 4.7 is not true. This example
is presented already in Sprumont (1990) as an example of a totally balanced game that lacks
a PMAS. In fact it is the four player ’glove game’ where two players possess a left-hand glove
and the other two players a right-hand glove.






0 if |S| ≤ 1 or S ∈ {{1,2},{3,4}};
1 if |S| = 3 or S ∈ {{1,3},{1,4},{2,3},{2,4}};
2 if |S| = {1,2,3,4}.
The values of M∗,A(N,v) = MA(N,v) = M∗,B(N,v) = MB(N,v) are given in Table 5. 3
5 A sequence of minimization problems
In this section we follow Kohlberg (1971) and show that premonoclus A can be found by solving
a sequence of LP problems.17
1 2 3 4
{1} 0 * * *
{2} * 0 * *
{3} * * 0 *
{4} * * * 0














































Table 5: M∗,A(N,v) = MA(N,v) = M∗,B(N,v) = MB(N,v) in Example 4.4.









T:(i,S,T)∈S µ(i,S,T) ∀S ⊆ N ∀i ∈ S;
P
(i,S,T)∈S µ(i,S,T) = 1;
µ(i,S,T) ≥ 0 ∀(i,S,T) ∈ S.
We remark that the decision variables γ(S), S ⊆ N, are superﬂuous from a modeling point
of view, since they are fully dependent on the decision variables µ(i,S,T), (i,S,T) ∈ S. By
construction, we have that (γ(S))S∈2N\{∅} is a VSW.
Note that the objective function is linear and that the feasible area, i.e. the collection of
feasible µ(i,S,T), (i,S,T) ∈ S, is nonempty and compact. Hence, (P1) is well-deﬁned.8 Consider
an arbitrary optimal solution ((γ(S))S⊆N,(µ(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) of (P1). Set c1 = {(i,S,T) ∈ S |
µ(i,S,T) > 0} and set a(i,S,T) equal to the optimal value of (P1) for all (i,S,T) ∈ c1. Set a1
equal to this value as well.9
Let k ≥ 2 and suppose that LP problems (P1) up to (Pk−1) have been well-deﬁned and
have resulted in sets c1,...,ck−1, associated optimal values a1,...,ak−1, and numbers a(i,S,T),
(i,S,T) ∈ ∪k−1
l=1 cl. Furthermore, suppose S\ ∪k−1
l=1 cl 6= ∅. Now deﬁne LP problem (Pk) by
8With well-deﬁned we mean that (the feasible area is non-empty and that) the minimum exists.












T:(i,S,T)∈S µ(i,S,T) ∀S ⊆ N ∀i ∈ S;
P
(i,S,T)∈S\∪k−1
l=1 cl µ(i,S,T) = 1;
µ(i,S,T) ≥ 0 ∀(i,S,T) ∈ S.
We can identify two essential diﬀerences with respect to (P1). First, the values a(i,S,T),




l=1 cl µ(i,S,T) = 1 takes only variables into account asso-
ciated with elements of S that did not belong to a VSW that resulted in previous steps. All
remarks regarding γ(S) that we made directly after the deﬁnition of (P1) are valid for (Pk) as
well.
In Lemma 5.1 we show that (Pk) is well-deﬁned. Consider an arbitrary optimal solution
((γ(S))S⊆N,(µ(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) of (Pk). Set ck = {(i,S,T) ∈ S\ ∪k−1
l=1 cl | µ(i,S,T) > 0} and set
a(i,S,T) equal to the optimal value of (Pk) for all (i,S,T) ∈ ck. Set ak equal to this value as
well.
Lemma 5.1 The optimization problem (Pk) is well-deﬁned.
Proof: First note that the objective function is aﬃne. Secondly, note that the feasible set Fk
is of the type {x ∈ I Ru | Ax = b;x ≥ 0} for some m × u-matrix A and b ∈ I Rm.10 Furthermore,
since S\∪k−1
l=1 cl 6= ∅, it holds that Fk is nonempty. As a consequence of the fact that the system
Ax = b has solutions we can assume without loss of generality, by considering the row echelon
form of A, that rank(A) = m. Representation Theorem 2.6.7 in Bazaraa et al. (1993) implies
that, since Fk is nonempty, it has extreme points x1,...,xr and extreme directions d1,...,dt







u=1 αu = 1;
αu ≥ 0 for every u ∈ {1,...,r};
βv ≥ 0 for every v ∈ {1,...,t}.
The structure of Fk implies that for all v ∈ {1,...,t} we have Adv = 0 and dv ≥ 0. Consider
x ∈ Fk such that βv > 0 for some v ∈ {1,...,t}. We will show that the objective func-
tion value does not increase if we go from x to x − βvdv. Since dv ≥ 0 and since condition
P
(i,S,T)∈S\∪k−1
l=1 cl µ(i,S,T) = 1 holds for both x and x−βvdv we conclude that dv can be written
as dv = ((µ(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) with µ(i,S,T) = 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ S\∪k−1
l=1 cl. Let (γ(S))S⊆N be the
corresponding values of the variables (γ(S))S⊆N. Since dv 6= 0 we can let l∗ < k be the highest
10 This requires a representation of the optimization problems without superﬂuous variables γ(S). See the
comments directly after the description of the optimization problems. We will use the representation without
these superﬂuous variables in the proof of lemma 5.1 only.19
























The expression before the inequality represents the change in the objective function of (Pk) if
we add δdv to a candidate solution of (Pk). We conclude that the objective function of (Pk)
does not increase it we go from x to x − βvdv. Hence, the optimal value for the objective
function is obtained for some x that belongs to the set of convex combinations of the extreme
points. This being a compact set completes the proof. 2
Let k∗ be the index such that ∪k∗
l=1cl = S. This k∗ exists because of the ﬁniteness of S. The
procedure described above results in a number a(i,S,T) for any element (i,S,T) ∈ S and in an
ordered partition of S. Any two elements in the same partition element have the same number,
any partition element, together with the earlier partition elements, corresponds to a VSW, and
the numbers associated with consecutive partition elements are weakly increasing. Consecutive
partition elements may have the same associated number for all its elements. Merge those
consecutive partition elements to end up with partition (b1,...,bp) in which any two elements
in the same element of the partition have the same number, any partition element, together
with the earlier partition elements, corresponds to a VSW (combining the VSWs of the sets of cl
this partition element is created from), and the numbers associated with consecutive partition
elements are strictly increasing. If these numbers would correspond to a payoﬀ vector scheme
this payoﬀ vector scheme would, in view of Theorem 4.4, be premonoclus A. The following
lemma shows that the numbers indeed correspond to a payoﬀ vector scheme.
Lemma 5.2 There exists a unique payoﬀ vector scheme such that its monotonicities equal the
numbers that form the outcome of the sequence of LP problems.
Proof: Let (c1,...,ck∗) be the partition arising from the solution of LP problems
(P1),...,(Pk∗), let a(i,S,T), (i,S,T) ∈ S, be the corresponding numbers and a1,...,ak∗ the
corresponding optimal values. Finally let, for every r ∈ {1,...,k∗}, xr be a corresponding
optimal solution.
Let S ⊂ T and i ∈ S. An i-path J from S to T is a sequence of elements (i,S0,S1),
(i,S1,S2), ..., (i,Sk−1,Sk) in S such that S0 = S and Sk = T. The sum
Pk
j=1 a(i,Sj−1,Sj) is20
called the value of i-path J. We will show that two diﬀerent i-paths from S to T have the
same value.
Suppose to the contrary that there exist two i-paths J and K from S to T with a diﬀerent
value. Without loss of generality assume that J and K are disjoint. Let l∗ ∈ {1,...,k∗} be
the minimal element such that J ∪ K ⊆ ∪l∗
r=1cr. Let Jr = J ∩ cr and Kr = K ∩ cr for all
r ∈ {1,...,l∗}. Note that J = ∪l∗
r=1Jr and K = ∪l∗
r=1Kr. Since i-paths J and K have a









r=1 |Kr|ar =: δ. Now x =
Pl∗
r=1 xr = ((γ(S))S⊆N,(µ(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) is an
optimal solution for (Pl∗) as well with the property that µ(i,S,T) > 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ ∪l∗
r=1cr.
Let  = 1
2 min(i,S,T)∈∪l∗





µ(i,S,T) +  if (i,S,T) ∈ J;
µ(i,S,T) −  if (i,S,T) ∈ K;
µ(i,S,T) otherwise.
The triple ((γ(S))S⊆N,(ν(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) does not provide a feasible solution to (Pl∗) in
general; the only requirement that might not be satisﬁed being
P
(i,S,T)∈S\∪l∗−1
l=1 cl µ(i,S,T) = 1.
Going from µ to ν has increased this sum by (|Jl∗| − |Kl∗|) ∗  (note that this amount can be
zero or negative as well). Moreover, the value of the objective function of (Pl∗) has increased
by (|Jl∗| − |Kl∗|) ∗  ∗ al∗ −  ∗ δ. Dividing ((γ(S))S⊆N,(ν(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) element-wise by
P
(i,S,T)∈S\∪l∗−1
l=1 cl ν(i,S,T) = 1+(|Jl∗|−|Kl∗|)∗ provides a feasible solution with an associated
objective function value that is strictly smaller than al∗. A contradiction.
From now on we will denote the value of an i-path from S to T by w(i,S,T). Deﬁning the
payoﬀ scheme y = (yS,i)S⊆N,i∈S by yS,i := v(i)+w(i,{i},S) for every S ⊆ N and i ∈ S it is clear
that y is the only candidate for being an eﬃcient payoﬀ scheme whose monotonicities coincide
with the number a(i,S,T) for every (i,S,T) ∈ S. It remains to show that
P
i∈S yS,i = v(S) for
all S ⊆ N.
Suppose that
P
i∈S∗ yS∗,i 6= v(S∗) for some S∗ ⊆ N. Let Ji be an i-path from i to S∗ for




i∈S∗ yS∗,i < v(S∗) and
P
i∈S∗ yS∗,i > v(S∗).
First, assume
P
i∈S∗ yS∗,i < v(S∗). Let x = ((γ(S))S⊆N,(µ(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) denote an opti-
mal solution for (Pl∗). Let  > 0 and deﬁne
ν(i,S,T) =
(
µ(i,S,T) +  if (i,S,T) ∈ J;
µ(i,S,T) otherwise.
Let Jl∗ = J ∩ cl∗. Going from µ to ν has increased
P
(i,S,T)∈S\∪l∗−1
l=1 cl µ(i,S,T) by |Jl∗| and the
11Note that i is ’ﬁxed’.21



































=  ∗ al∗ ∗ |Jl∗|
Normalizing (ν(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S to satisfy all constraints of (Pl∗) results with the appropriate




i∈S∗ yS∗,i > v(S∗). Since xr is an optimal solution for (Pr), for every
r ∈ {1,...,l∗}, we have that x =
Pl∗
r=1 xr = ((γ(S))S⊆N,(µ(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S) is an optimal
solution for (Pl∗) with the property that µ(i,S,T) > 0 for all (i,S,T) ∈ ∪l∗
r=1cr. Let  =
1
2 min(i,S,T)∈∪l∗
r=1cr µ(i,S,T) > 0. For all (i,S,T) ∈ S deﬁne
ν(i,S,T) =
(
µ(i,S,T) −  if (i,S,T) ∈ J;
µ(i,S,T) otherwise.
Similar as in the ﬁrst case, normalizing (ν(i,S,T))(i,S,T)∈S to satisfy all constraints of (Pl∗)
results with the appropriate (γ(S))S⊆N in a feasible solution for (Pl∗) with a lower value for
the objective function. A contradiction.
We conclude that y is eﬃcient. This completes the proof. 2
Using several results above the proof of the theorem below is easy.
Theorem 5.1 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. An (eﬃcient) payoﬀ vector scheme x is pre-
monoclus A if and only if ∪k
r=1br(x,N,v) allows for a VSW (i.e., there exists a VSW with
µ(i,S,T) > 0 for (i,S,T) ∈ ∪k
r=1br(x,N,v) and µ(i,S,T) = 0 otherwise) for all k = 1,...,px.
Proof: The if-part follows by Theorem 4.4. It remains to prove the only-if-part. Let x =
M∗,A(N,v). According to Lemma 5.2 there exists a unique payoﬀ vector scheme y such that
its monotonicities equal the numbers that form the outcome of the sequence of LP problems. By
construction the associated ordered partition is such that every partition element, together with
earlier partition elements, correspond to a VSW. By Theorem 4.4 we infer that y = M∗,A(N,v).
Hence x = y and therefore ∪k
r=1br(x,N,v) allows for a VSW for all k = 1,...,px. 2
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have initiated the explicit analysis of allocation scheme rules. Opposed to
allocation rules, an allocation scheme rule does not only provide a payoﬀ vector for the grand22
coalition, but also for any subcoalition. Rather than constructing an allocation scheme by the
usage of an allocation rule coalition-wise, we have constructed four allocation scheme rules that
have no (known) direct connection with any existing allocation rule.
Our allocation scheme rules are inspired by optimization techniques underlying the nucle-
olus. Where this results for the nucleolus, as well as for the prenucleolus, in an allocation
rule that provides a core-element whenever one exists, our allocation scheme rules provide a
population monotonic allocation scheme whenever one exists. The four rules diﬀer in the op-
timization domain and the monotonicities taken into account. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is thereby
similar to the diﬀerence between the nucleolus and the prenucleolus. The second diﬀerence is
initiated by two (equivalent) formulations of population monotonicity.
This work is not the ﬁrst to study allocations that are based on lexicographic optimization
techniques in a similar spirit as the nucleolus. Two well-known variants are the per-capita
nucleolus (cf. Young et al. (1982)) and the modiclus (cf. Sudh¨ olter (1996)). The per-capita
nucleolus satisﬁes an attractive monotonicity property that is not satisﬁed by the nucleolus,
namely nondecreasing payoﬀs as a result of an increasing value of the grand coalition. Extending
this requirement to other coalitions makes the per-capita nucleolus nonmonotonic as well. The
modiclus is based on lexicographically optimizing with respect to diﬀerences between excesses
(bi-excesses) and shares many properties with the per-capita nucleolus (see, e.g., Peleg and
Sudh¨ olter (2003)).
The research carried out in this work paves the way for diﬀerent types of follow-up research.
Our primary focus will be on the performance of monocli on speciﬁc types of coalitional games
(e.g., airport games) and on attempts to ﬁnd an axiomatic characterization. It is straight-
forward to show that the monocli satisfy properties dealing with eﬃciency, covariance, and
anonymity (symmetry), which should of course be suitably deﬁned for allocation scheme rules.
As for the nucleolus, additivity (linearity) will not be satisﬁed. Attempts to characterize these
rules along the lines of characterizations of the nucleolus would require a consistency type of
property. Here, one encounters a crucial diﬀerence between nucleolus and monoclus: for every
coalitional game a player has several (interrelated) associated payoﬀs. Taking this into account
in a consistency property seems far from straightforward. Finally, we mention that this work
might inspire others to initiate diﬀerent types of allocation scheme rules, rather than restricting
attention to coalition-wise extensions of allocation rules.
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